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Abstract
This survey of the recent analytical literature on price leadership shows that 
the identity and the characteristics of the leader are now well established. In a 
world without uncertainty, it is the most efficient but not necessarily the largest 
firm that is the leader. In a world with uncertainty, the best informed firm or the 
firm with the largest number of loyal customers is the leader.
With the help of repeated games, it is possible to determine the time path of 
the prices, characterised by rapid adjustments on the leader. An important 
conclusion emerges with regard to competition policy: price parallelism cannot be 
used as proof of tacit collusion.























































































































































































The invasion of economic theory by game theory does not seem to have 
spared any part o f microeconomic theory. In this article, I intend to give an 
account of the beneficial contributions of this invasion for a better understanding 
of parallel behaviour and its more or less collusive nature. Inevitably, attention will 
be focused on price leadership1 which is frequently observed in oligopolistic 
markets2.
When leadership is mentioned the Stackelberg model comes to mind. Two 
firms have quantity strategies and the leader increases his market share (and his 
profit) by anticipating the follower’s behaviour (who takes the leader’s output as 
given). Unfortunately, this model does not adequately explain parallel behaviour 
such that the announcement by a firm of a new price is very quickly adopted by its 
competitors. On the one hand, the sequential character of these announcements is 
neither modelled nor explained. On the other hand, the identity of the leader 
remains undetermined: the two Stackelberg firms both want to be the leader.
Can one define a non-cooperative equilibrium which incorporates sequential 
decisions and in which the identity of the leader is endogenous? In the following, I 
shall describe the progress made, step by step, in order to answer this question. 
Quite naturally, the first analytical efforts used static games (with or without 
uncertainty). More recently, the problem has been re-examined in a repeated game 
framework.
'I limit myself to the case where a single firm announces a price, followed quickly by the other 
competitors. Therefore, I do not consider the situations of collusive price leadership where a 
group of dominant firms is followed by a competitive fringe. The conditions in which such 
groups can be formed and can be maintained are examined, for example, by Markham (1951), 
Oxenfeldt (1952), Lanzillotti (1957), d’Aspremont et til (1983) and Sleuwaegen (1985). Shaw 
(1974) discusses the difficulties of leaders, faced with new entry, in the UK petrol industry. The 
welfare losses associated with these situations are empirically evaluated by Gisser (1984 and 
1986), Dickson (1988), Gisser (1988), Willner (1989) and Gisser (1989) for the US. The legal 
concept of “collective dominance” used recently by the European Commission with reference to 
article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, seems to correspond to the concept of collusive leadership of 
the above mentioned economists (see “Re Italian Flat Glass,” Common Market Law Report, 1990, 
4, 535). Naturally, I will discuss non-cooperative equilibria of the leader-follower type which 
imply collusive profits.
2Several cases of price leadership in the US are well documented in Scherer and Ross (1990, 
Chapter 7). On Europe, see Bourdet (1988, pp. 177-188) and Kirman and Schueller (1990) on 
the automobile industry and Phlips (1962, Ch. 8) on photographic products. Fog (1960) 





























































































This dynamic approach illustrates the role played by pre-play conventions 
on the policy to be followed during the game. It will be shown that price 
parallelism over time which characterises price leadership is facilitated by an 
implicit convention between the players, according to which they agree to adopt 
the same rule of behaviour. This rule says that each one will align to the other as 
soon as a price rise is announced by one of the players. An important distinction is 
thus made between a “pricing policy” agreed upon before the beginning of the 
game and the fixing of a particular price in the course of the game. (In legal 
terminology, this convention is what one calls a “concerted practice” facilitating 
collusion). Spatially, the adoption of a rule of alignment on prices calculated from 
multiple basing points plays the same role. I could not resist the temptation to 
devote a final section to this spatial pricing policy. Particular attention will be 
given to the implications for competition policy, as pursued by the European 
Commission, the more so as the convention on spatial alignment is rendered 
obligatory (sic!) by the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in the coal and steel industry.
2. Static Games without Uncertainty
Let us, to begin with, confine ourselves to a world without uncertainty and 
pinpoint some studies that have deepened Stackelberg’s contribution while 
remaining faithful to the assumption that the players use either quantity strategies 
or price strategies. Under what conditions would a duopolist have an interest in 
being the first to move given this assumption? Gal-Or (1985) shows that this 
depends on the slope of the reaction functions. If these functions are both 
decreasing, as in the case of quantity competition between homogeneous products 
where the strategies are negatively correlated, the leader makes more profit than the 
follower. If these functions are both increasing, as in the case of price competition 
between differentiated substitutes where the strategies are positively correlated, it is 
the follower who makes the largest profits. In the first situation, each firm prefers 
to be the leader. In the second situation, each firm prefers the other to be the 
leader, if both firms have similar profit functions. This is Dowrick’s (1986) point. 
In other words, if both firms have positively sloped reaction functions, the 
Stackelberg game has a reasonable solution only if the firms are sufficiently 
asymmetric in terms of costs and demand, such that one will prefer to lead. With 




























































































Clearly, the preceding analysis does not entirely answer the question of who 
will be the leader. Just because one firm wishes to be the leader, that does not 
imply that the other firm will agree to be the follower. If the two firms prefer to 
lead (or follow), neither can claim the preferred role. And even if the two firms 
agree that one of them should lead, it remains to be shown that this solution is the 
relevant non-cooperative equilibrium rather than a non-cooperative equilibrium 
with simultaneous actions. This is why Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) analyse an 
extended game where the players must choose both an action and the date of this 
action. If  the firms have to carry out the action for which they have chosen a date, 
sequential results are obtained for non-dominated strategies. However, if the firms 
choose the date but need not specify the action they will take when they choose to 
lead, the equilibrium will result in simultaneous actions unless the resulting profits 
from the sequential actions Pareto dominate, that is to say, unless the two prefer 
the same sequential action to a simultaneous action. The existence of leader- 
follower type equilibria is thus well established. The equilibria typically arise in 
asymmetric cases where the firms are different and where they use price strategies.
I do not wish to explore these generalities any further, but rather specify, in 
more detail, the asymmetries and further enlarge the set of feasible strategies, for 
example3 by combining price and quantity strategies. In this respect, O no’s 
approach (1978) appears exemplary: it uses more realistic assumptions and leads to 
precise results (at the cost of a loss in generality).
Ono assumes that the follower fixes a price infinitesimally smaller than that 
of its competitor and determines his output under the assumption that he is facing 
the entire demand of the market at this price (the products being homogeneous). 
The leader knows that the follower acts in this way and determines his price and 
output with respect to his individual demand curve. The latter is obtained by 
subtracting the rival output from the market demand curve.
We can represent the (downward sloping) market demand curve by 
x = D(p). If  the leader (firm 1) fixes a price p, then the follower (firm 2) 
determines its output such that p = C'1[x2) where C2'(x2) is the (com ex) marginal 
cost. The output of the follower is therefore
Xl=C 'i\p) if C2(0) < p i  C2'{d (/>)}. (1)
3 Anderson (1987) shows, in the framework of the Hotelling model, that the introduction of the 




























































































The follower monopolises the market if p> The individual demand
curve o f the leader is thus
*, = £(/>) if p±< z{o)
X l =  D (p )-C ’-'{p) if C2'(0 )< p < C 2'{Z)(p)} (2)
x, = 0  if p > Q {D {p )\
From these assumptions, Ono (1978 and 1982) obtains the following results for
homogeneous products4:
1. If one of the firms has sufficiently low marginal costs such that the 
optimal output of any other firm choosing to be leader is sufficiently 
small, it is more profitable for this firm to be the leader. Moreover, 
when a firm makes more profit as leader than as follower, all other 
firms prefer to follow. Put more simply, “sufficiently inefficient” 
firms prefer to follow whilst the “sufficiently efficient” firm prefers to 
lead. This implies that a Stackelberg war is impossible in 
equilibrium.
2. When each firm has the same marginal cost, they all prefer to follow.
3. All firms which accept to lead can obtain a greater profit than in the 
Nash equilibrium. Thus there is a common disadvantage when all 
firms try to act as a follower vis-a-vis the others.
Ono (1982) notes that the firm which leads voluntarily is not necessarily the 
one which has the largest market share. Figure 1 illustrates this possibility. Firm 1 
has the lowest marginal cost and will therefore be the leader. M N  is the market 
demand curve. The residual demand curve of the leader is ST, obtained by 
horizontal subtraction of the marginal cost of the follower MC2. The point where 
marginal revenue (MR\ j equals marginal cost (a/C, Jgives the price B, for which 
firm 1 receives the profit ABDE (whilst the follower makes the profit ACF). At the 
leader’s price, B, the leader’s market share, AB, is smaller than the follower’s, AC. 
When examining the profits that firm 2 could make as the leader, it can be seen 
that it is in the interest of firm 1 to be the leader and of firm 2 to be the follower. 
Firm 2’s residual demand curve would be QR and its marginal revenue would be 
MR\, so that it would fix price H and would gain profit GHKF, which is smaller 
than ACF. In this case, firm 1 would only obtain GLE<ABDE.




























































































Like Ono, Boyer and Moreaux (1986, 1987) endow firms with price and 
quantity strategies. However, they do this for both duopolists, while only the 
follower is allowed two strategies in O no’s approach, the leader having to be 
satisfied with fixing the price. Boyer and Moreaux (1987, note 4) criticise this 
assumption in the following words: “Why would the leader give the follower the 
possibility of acquiring the market share that the latter prefers? This is a privilege 
that the leader gives to the follower and is contrary to the interests of the leader. 
No valid justification of such a philanthropic behaviour is given by Ono.” I do not 
understand this criticism. The possibility of appropriating the market share that is 
optimal for the follower (including the whole of the market) with an infinitesimal 
price decrease, results from the homogeneity of the product and has nothing 
philanthropic about it. Given this homogeneity, the interest of the leader is to put 
itself on its residual demand.
In the models of Boyer and Moreaux, each firm fixes a price and decides to 
“offer” a certain quantity, in the sense that at this price it is willing to sell this 
quantity or less (but not more). There is, therefore, a possibility of rationing, each 
firm being able to put itself below its demand function. This assumption is 
supposed to correspond to observed business behaviour. “Rare, indeed, are firms 
who would accept to sell a certain quantity whatever the market price, which is 
what an output strategy ultimately implies . . .” (Boyer and Moreaux, 1986, p. 57). 
Here again it is difficult to understand. What I do understand is the remark made 
by Friedman (1983, pp. 47-48) that car manufacturers are obliged to plan their 
production in advance and subsequently to fix a price that the market will accept. 
It is in this way that output strategies can be interpreted in business practice. I also 
note that the choice of the rationing scheme remains entirely arbitrary: random 
rationing is postulated for the sole reason that it is simple! I finally note that, in 
practice, firms try to avoid having to ration their customers, because a rejected 
customer is a lost customer5.
Whatever the case, let us consider what type of equilibrium the assumption 
of demand rationing leads to. As in the Ono model, when the costs of production 
are identical or similar, both firms prefer to be the follower. If, to the contrary, 
there is a substantial cost difference, the non-cooperative equilibrium can only be 
of two different types. In one case, the least efficient firm behaves as leader and 
sells a limited quantity at a low price, whilst the most efficient firm behaves as a 
follower and sells to the residual demand at a higher price. In the other case, the
5Delivery delays which are typical for certain makes of car (Mercedes!) can be interpreted as a 

























































































































































































most efficient firm eliminates the other by adopting a limit-price strategy. In 
doing so, it receives a lower profit than if it had behaved as a follower. To sum up, 
this is the world upside-down, the intuition being that the poor buyers who are not 
served by the leader will be exploited by the follower.
3. Static Games with Uncertainty
The results obtained by Ono in a static world without uncertainty (and 
where the players are perfectly informed) are already very satisfying. Let us 
nevertheless see how the analysis can be refined by confronting the players with 
imperfection information. I will first introduce demand uncertainty. Secondly, I 
will examine how the Stackelberg leader emerges when production costs are 
uncertain. Finally, I will examine the role a group of loyal customers, who cannot 
be distinguished from price sensitive consumers, may play.
Let us assume that the firms are confronted with both a random market 
demand and an uncertain market share. When an economic shock (for example, a 
recession) occurs, it is immediately reflected in their sales and in their stocks. For 
the individual firm, the reason for this is not clear: is the unexpected fall in sales 
due to a shift in the market demand function or is it due to a random variation 
around an unchanged function? In order to detect the shock, the firm must 
estimate market demand. But for this, its own sales are the most immediate source 
of information.
Eckard (1982) thinks that the smaller the market share of the firm, the 
greater the variance of its estimate will be, in view of the uncertainty about the 
evolution of its rivals’ sales (and, therefore, about its own market share). In fact, 
rival competition generates statistical “noise” which reduces the precision of its 
estimate. The probability of detecting the shock (and of a suitable reaction in 
price) is therefore greater for the firms who have the relatively larger market shares.
From here, the transition towards a leader-follower model is immediate: on 
the one hand the largest firm is the most likely to be the first to detect the shift in 
market demand; on the other hand, the smaller firms observe the price reactions of 
the large firm, in order to get valuable information for their own market analyses. 





























































































This information is a public good which the leader provides to the whole 
industry. It remains to be seen whether the leader has an interest in obtaining this 
information, given that the gathering of information has a cost. Higgins et al. 
(1989) show that this is indeed the case. They assume that the industry is 
composed of r factories of equal size and that the dominant firm controls t of these. 
As in the Ono model, the small firms adopt the price fixed by the dominant firm 
and determine their sales by equalising their marginal cost with this price. Their 
global offer Of  is (r - t)p lc . The cost function of the dominant firm is
(c!2t)[p-Of  ̂ , where D=A+bp is the market demand and A = (X1 + --- + X„). 
G iven  0 ! (know n) th e  le a d e r ’s re s id u a l d em an d  is 
D -O l  = A + \bc-[r — t^plc  = A + Bp. A  is uncertain.
The variables X- are random, identically and independently distributed 
variables with mean f.iln and variance a 2. The dominant firm can know m among 
the Xt at a search cost of (d / l)m2 .Hence its profit function is
n  = (D  -  Of  )p -  [d2 t)[D  -  Of  )2 -  (d I2)m2 
= A (l/t) ( t  -  cB)p + ( \H t) ( l t  -  cB)Bp2 -  (c /2 t)A 2 -  (d l l ) m 2.
In a first stage, the expectation (conditional on the information obtained) is 
maximised to determine the optimal price p . Using this result, the unconditional 
expected profit
£"(tt) = y(ji* +mcr2)-(c/2r)rjo-2 ~(dl2'jm2 (4)
is maximised, in a second stage, to determine the optimal size of the sample m.
One obtains
m = ytj2 I d ,
where y  = -(l/2 t6 )(r-cS )2 l ( l t - c B } .
A similar calculation is made for the small firms. Their expected profit turns 
out to be an increasing function of m. The more precise the pricing policy of the 
dominant firm, the more profits they will make. Consequently, as Eckard had 
already noted, the variability of prices increases with the market share of the 
leader6.




























































































Note that in the Stackelberg game (using quantity strategies) where the 
leader has private information about the state of the market demand, this 
information is also revealed to the follower through the leader’s output. Gal-Or 
(1987) shows that, in a linear world, the inferences made by the follower increase 
the slope of its reaction function. This slope can even become positive if, at the 
time the follower revises its a priori beliefs, it gives sufficient weight to the quantity 
produced by the leader. Consequently, it is not necessarily true that the leader 
makes more profit than the follower, as was the case when there was perfect 
information (see above).
Consider uncertainty about the costs of production in a static non- 
cooperative duopoly game. Assume that the two firms neither know their own 
marginal cost nor their rival’s. However, they both know the parameters of the 
distributions from which these costs are drawn at the time when they agree on the 
distribution of roles (leader or follower). (In case of a disagreement, they will play 
the relevant Nash game). When they then decide on their output, they know their 
own but not their rival’s marginal cost.
It is with this information structure that Albaek (1990) proves the existence 
of a “Natural Stackelberg Situation” (NSS). Since it implies an agreement, there is 
a cooperative aspect to it. But, this is only apparent: true cooperation —  in 
particular an exchange of information — is excluded. The idea is to calculate the 
expected profits for the three possible outcomes: leader, follower or Nash, before 
the firms know their marginal cost. A NSS exists when one of the firms has the 
greatest expected profit as leader and the other as follower. A NSS does not exist 
when pricing strategies are used. Albaek emphasises that the solution does not 
depend on the substitutability or the complementarity of the products. Even when 
there is complementarity, a firm can still wish to be leader, because the strategic 
disadvantage of the leader can be compensated by better coordinated responses to 
cost variations. In the case of substitutability, it is the strategic disadvantage of the 
follower which can be compensated by the information it obtains on the costs of 
the rival.
It remains to introduce the role that customer loyalty can play in 
determining the identity of the leader. Deneckere et al. (1992) assume that two 
firms produce a non-durable differentiated product at zero cost. The consumers, 
who buy at the most one unit from one of the firms, are partitioned into three 
groups. In the first group, firm 1 has », loyal consumers, in the sense that they 




























































































second group consists of consumers who are loyal to firm 2, and are defined in a 
similar way. The third group is composed of m consumers who buy at the lowest 
price (as long as it is less than r). The two firms know the value of «, ,n2 and m but 
do not know which group a consumer belongs to (so that they cannot price 
discriminate).
The profit of firm i (£=1,2) is therefore
Li(pi) = (.ni + m)pi if p i< p j 
T,(p,) = (n, + D‘f m) p, if p, = pj 
H , ( p i )  = n , P i  if A > pj
(6)
on the assumption that the third group buys from the follower when prices are 
equal, so that D ‘f  = 1 if i  is the follower and D ‘r = 0 if i  is the leader. If nl >n2, firm 
1 has equilibrium profits nj = nr if it acts as either leader or follower or as a result 
of playing a simultaneous game (so that nx =nx = n/). This firm is therefore 
indifferent between the three situations. To the contrary, firm 2 (which has the 
smallest segment of loyal clients) prefers to follow (so n2 =(n2+ m)r) and is 
indifferent between leading and playing simultaneously (its profit then being 
n2 = ( ( « 2  +rn)/(nt + m))n/<n2). In equilibrium, p  = p2=r when firm 1 is the 
leader. If firm 2 leads, it attracts the third group at the cost o f a lower price 
fa = n / (k, + m) but firm 1 keeps the price p x—r and therefore continues to sell 
only to its own customers.
In order to show that firm 1 is the endogenous leader, Deneckere et al. 
construct a game in which the optimal date of the price announcements is 
determined. The time period considered is the unit interval [0,1], divided into T  
(T  even) periods of length r = \IT , where t = 0,---,7'-l. Firm 2 may announce its 
price at the beginning of intervals with an even index and firm 1 may announce at 
the beginning of intervals with an odd index7. There is a cost of waiting, so that 
profits are discounted using a discount factor S = e~p‘.
Proceeding backwards, firm 2 announces its leader price, p2, at time T—2 
since that is the last date at which it can fix a price. No price is announced 
previously. Firm 1 follows at T -l by announcing its follower price px. The 
discounted equilibrium profits will be 8t~'k2 and 8T~'nx respectively. At any
7The prices are fixed only once and remain in force for the duration of the unit interval rather 
than for a particular period. Profits only materialise after the moment when the two firms will 





























































































period £ (for t = 1,3,•••,7'-3) no price having previously been announced, firm 1 
must compare 8‘*'n[ to8‘*i*lttlL (if it leads at t+j, except when t - T - 3, since then 
the profit of the leader is zero at t+2) or to 8‘*‘nj in case it follows at t+j (j>2, 
even). However, we know that n j = zrf. Firm 1 will therefore always announce its 
leader price at the first opportunity (so long as no price has been previously set). 
As for firm 2, it must therefore, at £=0,2,4, •••, T-4  compare fi,+1jTjto the profit it 
would have earned after having waited for the announcement of firm 1, that is 
8‘*2i t If (» j/a f )< 5  it prefers to wait. However, n[ > n[. For a sufficiently large 
discount factor 8, firm 2 will always wait until firm 1 has fixed its leader price at 
£=1, and fix its follower price at 1=2. Firm 1 is an endogenous leader.
It is clear that this model enables us to understand why, in an international 
context (for example within the Common Market), national firms emerge as 
leaders in their respective national markets to the extent that patriotic feelings 
ensure them more loyal customers.
The chronological order of the events is explicidy taken into account in the 
preceding paragraphs but the equilibrium prices announced at a certain date are 
the result of an instantaneous game. The time has come for us to turn towards a 
dynamic approach in which the time shape is incorporated in the basic model. A 
repeated game appears to be the simplest approach to take.
4. A Repeated Game
The pricing policy examined here is often observed in oligopolistic markets. 
Often, there is one firm which announces a price change some time before the date 
at which the new price will be valid. This date, as well as the new price, are 
adopted after a brief delay by the other firms. The new price is often accepted as 
such, even when the products are differentiated, so that all the rival firms make the 
same announcement within a short time period8. The question ro answer is 
whether collective behaviour of this type can lead to collusive results in the absence 
of explicit collusion. The answer of Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) is affirmative.
®Often as well, a considerable time period separates the dates at which the prices change. This 
price “rigidity” should not be confused with a small variability (which depends on the size of the 
price variation). Rotemberg and Saloner (1990, pp. 100-104) show that such a rigidity can 
reduce the difference between the profit of the leader and that of the follower (which occurs 




























































































The model has two firms producing good 1 and good 2 respectively at a 
constant marginal cost c. The demand curves of these firms are
qi =x-bpi +d(p2- p l)
q1=y-bp1+d{p,-p1\
They are symmetric, apart from the intercepts x  and y. These parameters 
fluctuate over time. Define a = (x + y )/2 and e = (x -y )/2 . Hence, equations (7) 
become
q,=a + e-bp+ d(p2- p )  
q1= a -e -b p 1+d(px- p 2).
The change in variables gives a common component, a, which affects the 
level of the two demands in the same way, and an idiosyncratic component, e, 
which increases qx by the same amount as it decreases q2.
The information structure is the following. Firm 1 knows the values of a 
and e whereas firm 2 knows only their distribution, as well as the history of the 
prices and the quantities. When a and e are distributed independently, this history 
does not give any information about the current value of a and e. As a 
consequence, firm 2 only knows the unconditional means, which are a' and zero. 
Firm 1 is unable to communicate its information in a credible way.
If the information had been perfect, the firms would have been able to 
maximise joint profit, that is \qx(px~ c) + q2(p2 — c)], which would have led them to 
announce two different prices
px = [a/b  + c + ej(b + 2d j]^2
p2 = \aj b + c-e/(b+ 2 d ^j 2 
and to obtain a global profit of
R = (a — bc) j2b + c11(2b + 4d}.
In reality, they play a non-cooperative repeated game whose collusive result 
can be sustained at equilibrium by the credible threat of a price war if one of them 
deviates from the agreed pricing policy. The collusive outcome results from an 
implicit preliminary agreement on the following pricing policy: at the beginning 






























































































has not previously deviated; firm 2 next announces the same price that period; if 
firm 2 should announce another price, an infinite price war would ensue, in the 
sense that in all following periods the announced prices would be the equilibrium 
prices of the corresponding static (single period) price leadership game.
At the equilibrium of the repeated game, firm 1 is certain its price is also 
that of the other (a = A = p)- Its profit for each period is therefore
*1 = { p -c){a+e~ bp) (ID
and in equilibrium
p = c/2 + (a + e)/lb (12)




/?2 = [a + e -  be) /4 b -(a  + e — bc]ejb (15)
so that the global profit is
R' = R[ + R'2 = {a -  be)1 j ib  -  e2/lb , (16)
which is less than the maximised joint profit R in (10) for e non zero. Note that if 
e is always equal to zero (the unknown level of demand is the same for the two 
firms), then R = R and R\ = R\: the two firms make the same profit and firm 1 
chooses the price which maximises the joint profit.
When e is different from zero, firm 1 fixes a price which raises its profit at 
the expense of overall industry profits. Then the average values of (15) and (16) 
decline as the variance of e rises: the expected profits of firm 2 and of the industry 
are decreasing in the variance of e. This gives firm 2 a specific motive to deviate 
from the agreed policy by announcing a lower price. It can be shown that, in fact, 
it will not deviate when orthodox behaviour ensures a higher profit than the 




























































































Price leadership by firm 1 is endogenous when the variance of e is 
sufficiently small with respect to the common variance of market demand. Indeed, 
the difference between the expected profit of firm 2 when firm 1 acts as leader and 
its expected profits when it acts itself in this capacity is
[£(*-* ')2-3 & 2]/4A. (17)
The variance of a must be at least three times that of e.
5. Price Parallelism and Collusive Practices
In terms of observed behaviour, the pricing policy analysed above leads to 
parallel price variations. MacLeod (1985) shows that it is possible to generalise this 
result for a market composed of n firms on certain conditions. Proof is thus given 
that a social convention to adopt a policy of parallel price variations leads towards 
collusive profits that are between those of a static Nash equilibrium and those 
resulting from the full maximisation of joint profits, given non-cooperative 
behaviour.
Let P = (pi,p2 ’'" ’Pn) be the vector of prices charged by the industry. 
Suppose also that the firms can announce the prices that will be applicable in the 
following period in advance and that firm i  announces a variation Api . Firm i  can 
be any firm.
The firms do not know the profit functions of their rivals, but they can 
observe the prices of the previous periods as well as the announced price change. 
They tacitly adopt the convention to react to the announcement according to an 
alignment rule, independent of the profit functions, which is written as
Apj = r;(P,Ap,), j  * i. (18)
MacLeod demonstrates that the agreed alignment is defined by
r;(P,Ap,) = APi, (19)
that is to say by price changes equal to those announced by i, when three 




























































































1. be continuously differentiable;
2. be independent of scale changes (for example inflation), that is 
r(aP,aAp,) = dr‘(P,Ap^ for all i , j  and a > 0;
3. be independent of the order in which the firms are indexed.
Convention (19) is independent of profits and leads nevertheless to tacit 
collusion in a signalling game where the players adopt the following strategy: (1) 
When a price increase is announced, follow it if it is profitable to do so and if the 
others do the same; otherwise, do not change the price; (2) when a price decrease is 
announced, follow it as long as it does not lead to prices lower than the prices P° 
which would result in a static Nash equilibrium; (3) if any rival firm does not 
behave according to (1) and (2), announce the punishment price P°. If each firm 
adopts this strategy, there exists a non-cooperative equilibrium with prices P 
higher than P° and lower than the prices which would maximise the joint profit on 
condition that the products are sufficiently close substitutes so that a unilateral 
price increase leads to a loss of profits. The price P results from parallel price 
increases thanks to convention (19), which ensures that the expectations about the 
rivals’ reactions are correct.
Convention (19) is therefore a “concerted practice”9. It makes “tacit” 
collusion possible, tacit collusion being nothing other than a collusive outcome 
obtained in a non-cooperative repeated game. The convention itself does not 
imply an explicit agreement. This explains the difficulty which the authorities in 
charge of competition policy (for example, in the enforcement of articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty of Rome), have in proving its existence. Can these authorities deduce 
the existence of a concerted practice, forbidden by article 85, paragraph 1 from the 
observation of parallel price variations? In other words, can they distinguish 
between the static Nash equilibrium P° and the collusive equilibrium P ? The
9Under the law of the Community, a concerted practice implies the existence of a common will 
that does not necessarily result from a legally binding agreement. See especially the judgments of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities on 14 July 1972, ICI (48/69, European Court 
Report*, p. 619), BASF (49/69, ECR, p. 713), Bayer (51/69, ECR p. 745), Geigy (52/69, ECRp. 
787), Sandoz (53/69, ECR p. 845), Francolor (54/69, ECRp. 851), Cassella (55/69, ECR p. 
887), Hoechst (56/69, ECR p. 927), ACNA (57/69, ECR p. 933); judgment of the 16 December 
1975, Suiker Unie e.a. (40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73, ECR p. 1663); judgment 
Of the 7 June 1983, Musique Diffusion Française (100 to 103/80, ECR p. 1825); judgment of 
the 28 MilT-h 1984, CRAM and Rheinzink (29 and 30/83, ECR p. 1679); judgment of the 14 
July 1981, ZiichnC 1172/80, ECR p. 2021), judgment of the 10 December 1985, Stichting 




























































































answer is no. In the framework of the MacLeod model, the answer is negative for 
two reasons. First, for parallel price changes to be sustainable, the products must 
be sufficiently close substitutes. For such products a price change by one firm 
immediately affects the profits of the rivals, regardless of the initial price level. 
Hence, we must expect all firms to respond at the same time to exogenous shocks, 
regardless of whether tacit collusion is present or not. The simultaneous nature of 
price changes, therefore, is not proof of collusion. Secondly, as long as the profit 
functions are not known, there are no systematic differences between the size of 
price responses at the non-cooperative and collusive equilibria. In particular, the 
identity of the price variations is not a proof in itself.
It is therefore unfortunate that the European Commission uses price 
parallelism as a proof of tacit collusion, as in the “Wood Pulp” decision of 19 
December 1984 {Official Journal no. L 85/1).
In 1981, six Canadian producers of wood pulp, ten American producers, 
eleven Finnish, six Swedish, one Norwegian, one Portuguese and one Spanish, plus 
the U.S. Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Association, the Finnish Sales Bureau and the 
Swedish Wood Pulp Producers’ Association were informed that the Commission 
had proof of collusive behaviour relating to their export prices to the European 
Community. The essential part of the proof was the parallelism in the evolution of 
the prices between 1975 and 1981. Within a few hours or a few days, the 
announcement of a new price was followed by the competitors. In fact, the 
quarterly prices were announced to the customers and to  ithe agents o f the 
producers a few weeks before each new quarter. As a consequence, the prices 
announced were identical in the North-West of Europeund almost identical in the 
South ofEurqpe. Scarce were ihe buyers who benefited from a discount. All the 
announcements were in American dollars (and not in the member countries’ 
national currencies). The majority of the producers were condemned to fines from 
50.000 to 500.000 ECU.
In The Economics o f Imperfect Information (pp. 183-193), I indicated how 
the Commission’s concept of “normal” or “active” competition diverges from 
elementary game theory. May it suffice to say that the Commission is wrong when 
it excludes that observed parallelism could be explained without collusion10. Since 
wood pulp is a strongly homogeneous product, identical and simultaneous price
certain number of producers appealed against the decision of the European Commission at 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in his conclusions presep^j on the 7th 0f 





























































































changes are not surprising and even inevitable with or without a rule of alignment. 
This is the more so as price information circulates extremely quickly between 
producers, agents and consumers of pulp. Paper producers exchange all 
information on the announced prices in a matter o f hours. They also inform pulp 
producers, through their agents, about the prices announced by their rivals. (In 
game-theoretic terms, the history of the game is perfectly known).
Two remarks will be added of which the first is particularly important in the 
wood pulp case. The demand for pulp has a pronounced seasonal character. The 
quarterly nature of the announcements is nothing special and does not suggest 
collusion. To announce new prices in advance does not imply, either, that an 
alignment rule exists. When stocks are important, as they are in the wood pulp 
industry, announcing a price increase in advance can simply create incentives to 
buy without delay. This smoothes out the orders and transfers the storage cost 
from the seller to the buyer.
The wood pulp case is a striking example of the difficulties that the anti­
trust authorities encounter when they suspect the existence of an alignment rule. 
Everybody can follow the rule without any formal agreement. And nobody can 
deduce from observed parallelism that such a rule has been followed.
The previous discussion focused on intertemporal alignments. It would 
have been possible to stop the discussion here, if there had not been a striking 
analogy with the spatial alignment rule which characterises the basing point price 
■system.
6. The Basing Point System in the ECSCn
In this final section we move to the spatial domain and try to show why the 
multiple basing point price system imposed by the Treaty of the ECSC implies a 
concerted practice that facilitates tacit collusion, exactly as the intertemporal 
alignment rule (19) does.
1 iThis section reproduces part of my paper “Basing Point Pricing, Competition and Market 
Integration” to appear in H. Ohta and J.-F. Thisse, Does Economic Space Matterl Essays in 




























































































First, a little history. Before 1951, the German and French steelmakers 
fixed their national prices according to a single basing point price system. 
Oberhausen was the only basing point for Germany. Thionville was the basing 
point for France. Consider Thionville: the biggest steel plants were located in and 
around that town. In all of France, the franco prices12 were calculated by 
summing the base price at Thionville plus the transportation cost to a particular 
delivery point. This implies that the franco prices went up to the extent that steel 
was moved towards the South and the South-West. Note also that the franco price 
went down when steel was produced in the South and transported for delivery 
towards the North. In other words, the big Northern producers were able to sell 
anywhere in France, while the small Southern producers were constrained to sell in 
their local regional markets. But the South was compensated for this in terms of 
phantom freight collected in the vicinity of its plants. The system was meant to 
keep the Southern producers happy and small. In that sense, it was the equivalent 
of a national geographical market sharing agreement.
When a common steel market between the Benelux countries, France, 
Germany and Italy was envisaged, the problem arose of how to define a common 
pricing policy, such that the prevailing allocation of geographical markets could be 
maintained. An agreement was reached after long discussions between the 
steelmakers. Far from being implicit, it was as explicit as possible, since it was 
written down in article 60 of the ECSC Treaty and thus became obligatory for 
everyone! This is the more surprising as similar conventions were declared illegal 
by the American courts because contrary to anti-trust legislation.
Different possibilities were discussed. Should a fob-mill13 pricing policy be 
imposed? In those days, economic theory considered this the only system 
compatible with a Pareto optimum. The big production centres didn’t like it, 
because they would have lost access to peripheral regional markets. In particular, 
the Belgian steelmakers (who had to export more than half of their production) 
would have lost many export markets inside the common market, given their 
location between Thionville and Oberhausen at a short distance from these 
centres. Second, it is very difficult to compute and compare delivered prices in any 
given location under a fob-mill system, because of the large number of steel plants 
in the European common market and because buyers can use different means of
12The “delivered” price is the price at the point of delivery. It is called the “franco" price when 
it is directly fixed by the producers.





























































































transportation (so that effective transportation costs vary from buyer to buyer). To 
enter a distant market, competitors would have had to grant secret price discounts. 
The end result would have been a series of regional price wars to avoid a loss of 
distant markets.
A single basing point system would have made it easier for the producers to 
compute the delivered price to be quoted in any location, given a particular means 
of transportation. But where to locate such a single basing point? Not in France, 
since that would have limited the geographical extent of German sales west and 
southwards. Not in the Ruhr area, for symmetric reasons. Not in Benelux or 
Italy: that would have made all other countries unhappy.
The only way to maintain the existing trade patterns inside and between the 
six countries was to create a multiple basing point system, characterised by an 
alignment rule. The alignment rule ensures that, at any geographical location, the 
delivered price to be quoted by all the competitors is equal to the lowest 
combination of a base price plus freight (to that location) calculated from all 
basing points existing in the system. (Since base prices differ, the lowest delivered 
price does not necessarily correspond to the nearest basing point). Thus at a given 
place of destination only a single delivered price is possible, identical, and known 
with precision regardless of the seller and regardless of the actual distance covered 
in carriage to the place of destination. Indeed, the freight to be added to the base 
prices is worked out from a published tariff accepted by all concerned, such as a 
railway company’s schedule of charges.
The analogy with the intertemporal alignment rule (19) is clear. The 
intertemporal rule and the spatial rule both ensure unicity of prices at any point in 
time or space. Each rule makes the reactions of the competitors perfectly 
predictable. Furthermore, spatial alignment simplifies the life of a possible leader: 
if a firm i wants to be the leader, it suffices to announce a sufficiently low base 
price so that the other producers are obliged (by the alignment rule) to adopt the 
delivered price of the leader at all their selling points; in a similar way, it suffices, 
for the follower, to announce a sufficiently high base price so that it is never 
applied.
The convention written down in article 60 of the ECSC Treaty is clearly a 
concerted practice transformed into a binding legal agreement in full contradiction 
with article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. It creates conditions which sustain a non- 
cooperative equilibrium whilst ensuring collusive profits. In more simple terms, 




























































































To see this, consider the functioning of the system. The obligation to align 
makes local price competition impossible. It is true that it guarantees a delivered 
price that is the lowest possible whatever the geographical location (the rules of the 
system, the base price and the transport tariff being given). Nevertheless, 
alignment has no competitive virtue. At first sight, the word alignment suggests 
aggressive behaviour. In reality, it is purely defensive, because it excludes the 
possibility of selling below the delivered price of the other firms. Given equal 
prices, the sellers can tie traditional pre-common-market customers to them 
wherever such customers may be located. The purpose is to freeze existing trade 
patterns and thus to leave market shares unchanged. Since alignment implies 
cross-hauls, the allocation of resources is less efficient than in the case of joint 
profit maximisation. The collusive profits made are therefore less than the profits 
resulting from explicit regional price agreements.
Figure 2 illustrates what has just been said and also shows that the alignment 
rule allows some interpenetration of markets without endangering the geographical 
price structure (that is to say, without provoking a price war). Space is represented 
on the horizontal axis. Points I and II represent basing points, where marginal 
costs are me, and mc2 respectively (me, < mcz j . The figure shows marginal delivered 
costs (marginal production cost plus unit transport cost). The announced base 
prices are j\ and />, from which the corresponding delivered prices increase in both 
directions. Firms located at II sell westwards until point a and eastwards until 
point h. Firms located at I sell eastwards until point c and then fro m /til l /
The firms align on the delivered price calculated from a base point which is 
not their own along the segments AB, BC, FG and GH. Along AB, firms located at 
II align on />,-plus delivered prices fixed by firms located at I (so that the delivered 
prices of firms II go down as they sell more toward I). Along BC, firms located at I 
align on the />2-plus delivered prices fixed by firms located at II (so that their 
delivered prices go down as they sell more toward II).
These alignments ensure that a) I can sell in the segment bc\ b) II can sell in 
the segment ab, and c) there will be no price competition pushing the delivered 
























































































































































































A similar argument applies to FG (where I aligns on />2-plus) and GH  
(where II aligns on />,—plus). Both centres enlarge their market area while avoiding 
price competition inside the area FGHI. Without the alignment rule, prices would 
have dropped to FIH  along the segment fh.
Finally, cross-hauling occurs over the distance between a and c.
7. Conclusions
This survey of the recent analytical literature on price leadership has shown 
that the identity and the characteristics of a price leader are now well established. 
In a world without uncertainty, it is the most efficient but not necessarily the 
largest firm that is the leader. In a world with uncertainty, the best informed firm 
or the firm which has the largest number of loyal customers is the leader.
With the help of repeated games, it is possible to determine the time path of 
the prices, characterised by rapid adjustments on the leader. An important 
conclusion emerges with regard to competition policy: price parallelism cannot be 
used as proof of tacit collusion.
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